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STUDY OF transportation in the United States makes
kne wonder if some Ancient Mariner has placed a curse
on the airline industry and hung an albatross around its
neck. Reports indicate that, as of August 20, 1993, the air-
line industry was $35 billion in debt.1 Projections for the
future are only cautiously optimistic, warning that a healthy
industry, which is able to generate enough revenue to re-
place aging aircraft and keep fares low enough to stimulate
demand, could be several years away.' Other problems face
the airline industry as well. As the concentration of airlines
has increased in recent years, most analysts predict that the
trend will continue. One estimate theorizes that the
number of surviving carriers will be no more than five or
six.3 Moreover, American airports themselves are exper-
iencing a capacity crisis that affects all countries and has
reached epidemic proportions.4 Despite the fact that new
runways take from four to eight years to complete and new
airports take anywhere from ten to fifteen years to finish,
no long-term nationwide airport improvement plan has
been created to make certain that such projects are devel-
oped in the near future.5 The poor health of the airline
industry and the nation's airports translates into a nation-
wide transportation problem that "seriously threatens the
ability of our carriers to compete in global aviation and,
even more important, tends to clog one of the vital engines
Airlines Still Need Tax, Regulatoy Relief National Commission Concludes, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at G-1, G-2 (Aug. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Aug. 1993 Tax Re-
port] (discussing tax and regulatory relief suggested by the National Commission to
Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry).
2 On a Wing and a Dime, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at S10, S16 [hereinafter On a
Wing].
- Note, The Antitrust Implications of Airport Lease Restrictions, 104 HARv. L. REv. 548(1990) (discussing barriers to airline entry at airports that lead to concentration in
the airline industry).
4 J. Donald Reilly, Regional Airports Needed to Solve Capacity Problems, AM. CITY &
CouNT, June 1990, at 32 (advocating a "comprehensive study of new airport needs
and measures").
5 Id.
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of our domestic economy - commercial air trans-
portation."6
This air transportation crisis was recognized first by Presi-
dent Bush in his transportation policy and then by Presi-
dent Clinton, who appointed the National Commission to
Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry (hereinafter
National Commission).' Congressional recognition of the
transportation problem occurred in 1990 when Congress
authorized airports to collect a three dollar maximum head
tax on all departing passengers.8 This head tax is called a
passenger facility charge (hereinafter PFC). Detailed fed-
eral regulations govern how airports obtain approval to col-
lect the charge and on which projects the money collected
may be spent.9 According to the regulations, money raised
from PFCs is to be used only for capital airport improve-
ment projects. 10
PFCs, however, are not without opponents, both inside
and outside the airline industry. While PFC proponents
seem to have secured the continued existence of PFCs,11
opinions clash over how the money collected should be
spent and what effect the revenue should have on the air-
line industry and transportation in the United States. 12
One of the most radical views of how to spend PFC revenue
was espoused by the City of Los Angeles during the 1992
elections, when it sought to transfer the funds to the city
6 RobertJ. Aaronson, Air Lacks Access to Rightful Funds, FIN. WORLD, Dec. 1991, at
78.
7 See Congress Mostly Ignores Airline Panel's Call for Tax Relief, Other Major Changes,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 177, atJ-1 (Sept. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Sept. 1994 Tax
Report]; Kevin Kelly, Midflight Correction? (Regulating the Airline Industry), COMMON-
wEAL, June 18, 1993, at 6.
8 49 U.S.C. § 1513(e), repealed &y Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),
108 Stat. 1379 (to be codifed at 49 U.S.C. § 40117); see also Lawrence L. Knutson,
Passenger Fee System Outlined, Regulations Issued to Launch Program, DmLy NEws OF L.A.,
May 24, 1991, at B4.
9 14 C.F.R. § 158.1 (1991).
1I Id.
nMineta Says Many Endorse Tax Relief to Help Finances of US. Airlines, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 88, at E-5, G-6 (May 10, 1993) [hereinafter May 1993 Tax Report]
(indicating congressional acceptance of PFCs).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 171-204.
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treasury to pay for police and firefighter services.' 3 This
Comment will offer legal and economic insights into PFCs
and suggest how the revenue they generate should be
spent.
Part I of this Comment tracks the course of the airline
industry from deregulation in 1978 to the present and ex-
plores its current status. Part II sets forth the governmental
response to the airline crisis and details the law of PFCs.
Part II also outlines the response to PFCs by setting out the
arguments of PFC proponents and opponents, focusing on
Los Angeles and Denver, two cities on the front lines of the
PFC revenue battle. Part III analyzes the possible effects of
PFCs on the airline industry and transportation in the
United States. Finally, this Comment suggests a few areas
where PFC revenue would be well spent.
I. DEREGULATION: BEFORE AND AFTER
In 1938, Congress brought airlines into the family of reg-
ulatory agencies it had first established with railroads and
motor carriers by creating the Civil Aeronautics Board
(hereinafter CAB) as an independent federal regulatory
agency. 4 The government chose to regulate the airline in-
dustry after observing the pre-regulation rise of the railroad
barons and recognizing that airplanes were more than a
passing fancy.15 Regulation was the result of foresight -
the airlines were more than an experimental toy, they had
the potential to become public utilities. In this way, the air-
line regulation "legislation was promulgated . . . to avoid
the deleterious consequences of cutthroat and excessive
competition, and thereby enhance economic stability,
is James Rainey, Funds for Senis at Issue in Airport, Sewer Measures, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
31, 1992, at B3.
14 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-722, repealed by Federal Avi-
ation Administration Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1542, repealed byAct ofJuly
5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (to be codifed generally at 49
U.S.C. §§ 40101-40120); see also Paul S. Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation-On a
Collision Course?, 13 TRANSP. LJ. 329 (1984) (examining airline deregulation and its
impact on economic decline, safety, pricing, service and carrier liability).
15 Dempsey, supra note 14, at 331.
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safety, and the sound growth and development of this
young industry." 6
The airline industry remained regulated for forty years.
Commentators differ on the success of regulation. Paul
Dempsey, a noted expert in transportation law who has
served on both the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the CAB,17 asserts that:
[R]egulation brought to the transportation industry the sta-
bility essential to its growth and prosperity, thereby enabling
the nation to enjoy a high level of safe and dependable ser-
vice at reasonable rates .... Transportation enjoyed a gen-
erous level of healthy competition without concentration -
an economic environment unequaled in almost all other
major American industries."i
Dempsey concedes, however, that the regulated airline in-
dustry was not a perfect system. In Dempsey's opinion,
among its principal faults were a high level of service com-
petition, empty backhauls, and some regulatory lag. 19 Yet
Dempsey asserts that by the mid-1970s the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had taken aggressive and successful ac-
tion to eradicate these problems.20
Robert Hardaway, who has written numerous responses
to Dempsey's articles, takes a different view of the same cir-
cumstances. For example, Hardaway claims that during
regulation, with no incentive to reduce costs, the airlines
engaged in wasteful and extravagant service competition.2'
As an example, he cites airlines that offered such frills as
gourmet meals and states that the competition culminated
in the so-called 'liquor wars,' in which airlines competed by
offering free liquor to customers.2 2 Regardless of how suc-
16 Id. at 335.
17 Id. at 329 (biographical footnote).
1S Id. at 335-36.
19 Id. at 339.
- Id.
21 Robert M. Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide,
14 TRANSP. L.J. 101 (1985) (arguing that the tide has turned in favor of deregulation
after a period in which airlines fought recession, high fuel prices, and inflation).
22 Id.
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cessful regulation may or may not have been, its days were
numbered by the mid-1970s.
In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter appointed
economist Alfred Kahn to the position of Chairman of the
CAB.23 Kahn used his position to diminish entry barriers
for new carriers and encourage price competition. 4 Soon
thereafter, Darius Gaskins, a colleague of Kahn, was ap-
pointed Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission
by President Carter.25 It was not long until legislation
shored up the deregulatory turn of the tide in the airline
industry. Under the auspices of President Carter and Sena-
tor Ted Kennedy, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978.26 The Act disbanded the CAB and gave the
Department of Transportation (hereinafter DOT) authority
to review airline mergers. This authority ended on January
1, 1989, when the airline industry, like all other industries,
became subject to the review of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice.27
The first few years of deregulation brought many changes
to the airline industry. For example, service to small com-
munities deteriorated significantly. During the first year of
deregulation, 260 cities lost air service, and during the first
two years of deregulation, forty percent of the nation's air-
ports lost service.2 8 Changes also occurred in airline prof-
its. By 1980, with deregulation in full swing, airlines lost
more money than ever before. In that year the airline in-
dustry suffered record losses of $280 million.2 9 In 1982,
worldwide industry losses for the year were $900 million,
23 Dempsey, supra note 14, at 339.
24 Id.
25 Id.
2o 49 U.S.C. § 1301, repealed byAct ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat. 1390; see also Dempsey, supra note 14, at 339.
27 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (a) (7), 7eealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272,
§ 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (to be codified generally at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-46507); see also
Donald T. Bliss &Jacob M. Lewis, Overseeing Competition in the Airline Industry: Will the
Transfer tojustice Make a Difference?, 34 FED. B. NEws &J. 293, 295 (Sept. 1987) (ex-
ploring the difference in airline merger philosophy between DOT and the Depart-
ment ofJustice).
28 Dempsey, supra note 14, at 359.
- Id. at 342.
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despite the fact that the industry carried seven million more
passengers than it had in 1981.30
As with airline regulation, the wisdom of deregulation is
debated. Dempsey argues that "Et]he industry's principal
problem is excessive rate wars. Deregulation of entry
brought a host of new entrants to many heretofore healthy
markets .... Since transportation is an industry inherently
vulnerable to overcapacity, ... unconstrained entry must
necessarily lead to distress-sale pricing in those markets in
which competition is excessive."31 Conversely, certain statis-
tics indicate that deregulation has worked. The Brookings
Institute has calculated that consumers saved roughly $100
billion in lower fares in the first ten years of deregulation. 2
Moreover, airlines are carrying nearly twice as many people
with proportionately fewer accidents than before deregula-
tion.3 3 When asked why the industry is unhealthy,
" [p] roponents of deregulation point to poor management,
rising fuel prices and the recession, arguing that deregula-
tion did not contribute appreciably to the . . . industry
crisis."
34
Regardless of whether deregulation is to blame for the
industry's current ills, both deregulation proponents and
opponents agree that the airline industry is ailing. Indeed,
statisticians paint a grim and undeniable picture of the air-
lines' ill health. For instance, as of January 1994, the indus-
try had lost more than $11 billion since 1990.35 Most of the
airlines that started up after deregulation in 1978 are now
out of business. 6 Of the nation's twelve largest carriers,
three have failed.3 Moreover, many carriers have been
pushed into bankruptcy. Early pioneers like Eastern and
so Id.
" Id. at 350 (footnote omitted).
32 On a Wing, supra note 2, at S-10 (citing a study by the Brookings Institute).
33 Id.
-' Dempsey, supra note 14, at 349 (citation omitted).
35 Improving Industry Finances Dilute CaUs for Policy Changes, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA)
No. 18, at 9 (special supplement) (Jan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Jan. 1994 Tax
Report].
- Kelly, supra note 7, at 6.
37 Id.
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Pan Am no longer fly, and others, including Continental,
TWA, and America West, have sought protection under
Chapter 11 bankruptcy laws.3 8
Signs of hard times in the airline industry are present be-
yond the balance sheet and the bankruptcy list. For in-
stance, most major airlines have deferred new aircraft
orders and are retiring older planes.39 As planes are re-
tired, airline personnel are laid off. As of the summer of
1992, the industry had shed 100,000 jobs.40 During the
week of September 14, 1993, American Airlines retired
eleven DC-10s and cut its work force by 5000 employees. 41
In January 1994, "American Airlines announced yet an-
other round of layoffs, signaling another rough year for the
industry."42
Many factors have contributed to the current malaise in
the airline industry, including over-expansion, high em-
ployee salaries, and labor difficulties. For example, in 1991
and 1992, United, Delta, and American Airlines went on
"an aircraft buying binge."43 These airlines bought over
445 aircraft, expanding their fleet capacity by as much as
forty-three percent." For these airlines, over-expansion was
a risky gamble that did not pay off. The carriers believed
that, as bankrupt airlines went out of business, they would
take over the abandoned routes. When the recession drove
passengers off planes, however, and the bankrupt carriers
did not go out of business, the Big Three were forced to cut
prices to fill their new planes.4 5 To make matters worse,
airline industry over-expansion was not limited to the air,
but occurred on the ground as well, in the form of elabo-
3 On a Wing, supra note 2, at 510.
39 Richard M. Weintraub, Airlines Ry Into the Blue; 3rd Quarter Profits Could End 3-
Year Nosedive, WASH. Posr, Sept. 21, 1993, at C1.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Jan. 1994 Tax Report, supra note 35, at 9.
4- Kelly, supra note 7, at 6.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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rate and costly hub and spoke systems.' In one author's
appraisal of the industry:
Being over-eager to expand and grab market share has not
helped. Highly leveraged takeovers during the boom years
of the late 1980s saddled the industry with a huge load of
debt. By 1990 the five big airlines in financial trouble
(America West, Continental, Eastern, Pan Am and TWA)
had substantially increased their long-term debt as a per-
centage of total capitalisation to an average of over 80%. 4
High employee salaries and labor difficulties also plague
the industry. Salaries and benefits account for up to forty
percent of an airline's expenses. 48 In addition, "[t]ough
work rules, akin to those that hamstrung the auto industry
during the 1970s, sharply constrict productivity."49 Thus,
whether or not airline industry revenue losses may be attrib-
uted to airline deregulation, the shortage of profits has cer-
tainly been exacerbated by carrier over-expansion, high
employee salaries, and labor difficulties.
A. How THINGS STAND FOR THE INDUSTRY Now
Airlines did not sit by quietly after the bottom fell out of
their industry. Instead, they responded by cutting back on
the number of flights offered, from an average of 5.4 depar-
tures per day at the beginning of 1987 to 4.5 at the begin-
ning of 1993.50 Despite setbacks during the fare wars, the
airlines also raised the average price for tickets, hoping to
increase revenue even if the actual number of people flying
decreased. 51 In addition, the large carriers addressed the
problem of over-expansion by scaling back on their plans to
Id. For an explanation of the "hub and spoke" system as well as a synopsis of
the problems it creates for airports, see infta text accompanying notes 298-301.
47 On a Wing, supra note 2, at S15.
48 Kelly, supra note 7, at 6.
49 Id.
50 Weintraub, supra note 39, at Cl.
51 Id.
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buy more airplanes.5" Finally, the industry attempted to cut
costs through basic belt-tightening procedures.5"
Recent reports indicate that the result of these efforts to
cut costs and raise fares is beginning to show up in com-
pany balance sheets. 4 For example, the industry enjoyed a
"1994 first quarter operating profit of $137 million."55 Spe-
cifically, American Airlines' second quarter 1994 net profit
of $153 million was "up from $47 million during the same
period in 1993. " 56 Northwest experienced an even more
impressive turnaround. That carrier had a 1994 second
quarter net profit of $71 million compared to a $136 mil-
lion loss during the same period in 1993. 7 This recent up-
swing, however, is cause for neither rejoicing nor
complacency. David A. Swierenga, the Air Transportation
Association Vice President for Industry Data, said recent im-
provements in airline profits do not substantially help air-
lines meet the cost of long-term needs, including
purchasing new aircraft and other modernizations.58 Swier-
enga estimates these modernization costs to be about $13
billion per year.59 As a result, "even with a profit of $2 bil-
lion to $4 billion from depreciation, the industry would
have less than half of what it needs" to purchase new air-
craft and otherwise modernize without raising new equity
capital or borrowing. 0 Similarly, Lee Howard, president of
Airline Economics International, said that, despite an ex-
pected 1994 industry operating profit of $2.5 billion, "[t]ax
relief ... [is] still needed .... [W]hen you barely break
even in net, the industry is not doing that well."61
62 On a Wing, supra note 2, at S16.
-- Weintraub, supra note 39, at C1.
54 Id.
55 Sept. 1994 Tax Report, supra note 7, at J-1.
6 Id.
57 Id.
58 Weintraub, supra note 39, at C2.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Sept. 1994 Tax Report, supra note 7, atJ-1.
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B. AIRLINE INDUSTRY PROBLEMS TRANSLATE INTO
NATIONWIDE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS
"Never send to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for
thee."6" John Donne's words remind us that nothing exists
in isolation. Consequently, a crisis as large as that of the
airline industry does not affect only itself. Rather, the air-
line crisis reverberates throughout the entire economy.
The lack of airport capacity in the United States is an excel-
lent illustration of this principle. House Public Works and
Transportation Committee Chairman, Norman Mineta
believes the federal government's own failure to invest ade-
quately in the aviation system, including airports, has con-
tributed to the present situation by driving up costs at
'bottleneck' airports. "These 'chokepoints' he said, 'affect
more than the financial health and well being of an airport,
or of an airline: the effects are felt throughout our entire
economy.' "63
Likewise, Samuel Skinner, President Bush's Secretary of
Transportation, linked the airline industry crisis to the na-
tion's transportation problem. On March 3, 1990, Skinner
asserted that the chronic problems in U.S. transportation
are congestion and delay.64 That delay takes the form of an
ill-structured transportation system and a lack of physical
capacity. Twice as many people are flying as were ten years
ago, yet only two new airports have been built, including
Denver, which was only recently completed. "We have any-
where from $20 billion to $30 billion immediate need for
airport capacity in the country right now .... Americans
spend more than 2 billion hours annually in travel delays in
urban areas. Twenty one airports, Skinner said, now experi-
ence more than 20,000 hours of yearly flight delays."
65
62 John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions Meditation, in 1 THE NORTON AN-
THOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1063, 1107 (5th ed. 1986).
63 May 1993 Tax Report, supra note 11, at G-6.
64 Kathy Lewis, Bush Transit Policy Shifts Gears; Would Raise Local, State Funding
Load; Critics Say President Shirking Federal Role, Hous. POST, Mar. 9, 1990, at Al.
65 Id.
1050 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
Indeed, airport expansion has been largely put on hold
in many cities in the last fifteen years, causing major delays
that have made air travel more vexing, inefficient, and even
hazardous.6 6 In addition, the United States government
fears the economic impact of an airline industry too weak
to fend off strong foreign competitors such as British Air-
ways.67 In this way, the problems of the airline industry,
such as lack of airport capacity, are felt throughout the en-
tire transportation system and economy of the United
States.
There has been an increasing awareness of the need for
improvements in the aviation industry in light of the link
between the state of the airline industry and transportation
in the United States.68 Although perhaps not so visible as
bridges near collapse, the neglect of this country's aviation
infrastructure over the years is every bit as devastating.69
Suggestions have been made for improving aviation infra-
structure. For example, regarding lack of airport capacity
and the need for expansion and new facilities, the recent
wave of military base closings offers some new alternatives
for airport sites. Although a new airport may not necessar-
ily be needed at the time of a base shutdown, it has been
suggested that these facilities could be preserved as airports
to be available for commercial use as demand grows.7" Fi-
nally, House Public Works and Transportation Committee
Chairman Norman Mineta says that the federal government
must make it a priority to modernize air traffic control
equipment and improve airports to meet air travel demands
David Hess, House Approves Head Tax at Airports; Sponsors Say $3 Charge Will Sup-
plement Funding for Improvements, DAILY NEWS OF LA., Aug. 3, 1990, at N10.
67 Kelly, supra note 7, at 6. Interestingly, the National Commission recom-
mended linking "greater foreign investment [in U.S. airlines] . . . to air service
agreements that create better opportunities for U.S. airlines in the global market."
Sept. 1994 Tax Report, supra note 7, atJ-4. As of Sept. 1994, however, the Clinton
Administration has met with strong European opposition to increased American car-
rier competition in their countries. Id.
- See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 4, at 32.
69 Aaronson, supra note 6, at 78.
70 Id.
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safely. 71 Mineta has stated that this priority includes ensur-
ing that the airlines in the system are financially able to
maintain their fleet.72 Thus, the need to bolster the airline
industry and ameliorate transportation problems through-
out the country by improving aviation infrastructure has
been recognized.
II. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE
AIRLINE CRISIS
A. THE EXECUTIVE RESPONSE
On March 8, 1990, against the backdrop of airline reve-
nue loss, congestion, and travel delays, President Bush re-
leased a transportation policy for the 1990s that went
beyond emphasizing toll roads and user fees and relied
heavily on increased state and local funding.73 In a general
response to the transportation problems in the United
States, Samuel Skinner, President Bush's Secretary of Trans-
portation, presented his 129-page report entided "Moving
America: New Directions, New Opportunities."74 The re-
port made several recommendations to help ease the trans-
portation problem, including: increased federal research
and development funding for aviation capital improve-
ments, air traffic control modernization, and airport grants;
increased state and local matching shares and greater flexi-
bility for urban mass transit programs; increased aviation
user fees to improve service; increased airport capacity by
allowing local PFCs; increased private participation in local
transit and airports; increased competition in the airline in-
dustry; deregulation; and environmental and safety goals.75
The Clinton Administration has also responded to the
crisis in the aviation industry. In late April 1993, President
71 May 1993 Tax Report, supra note 11, at -6.
72 Id.
7- Lewis, supra note 64, at Al (responding to critics who claimed Bush is shirking
the federal responsibility, Bush's "Secretary of Transportation countered that the
federal government has assumed too much over the years" ).
74 Id. at A13.
75 Id.
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Clinton appointed a committee entided the National Com-
mission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry to
study "whether the nation's beleaguered air carriers could
benefit from a healthy dose of government authority."76
The bipartisan commission was chaired by former Virginia
Governor Gerald Baliles and consisted of fifteen voting
members, including one airline official, Herbert Kelleher,
Chief Executive Officer of Southwest Airlines. 77 Commis-
sion deliberations began on May 24, 1993, and ended in
August of that year. The National Commission's report to
the President and Congress made recommendations on
possible solutions to the problems plaguing the airlines.
The report rejected regulation of the airline industry as
well as several other proposals, including those that would
shut down the major airlines now operating under Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection. 78 Instead, the National Commis-
sion recommended substantial changes in the air traffic
control system.79 It also approved certain tax proposals
benefiting the airlines, such as "[r] olling back the ticket tax
from 10 percent to 8 percent and the cargo waybill from
6.25 percent to 5 percent."80 The report also recom-
mended "[r]igorous enforcement of existing Airport Im-
provement Program grant assurance language barring
diversion of airport revenues to non-airport purposes ...
[and] continued close scrutiny of airport proposals to col-
lect [PFCs]."81 The airline industry responded favorably to
the Commission's report and is looking to the Clinton Ad-
ministration to implement many of its recommendations. 82
76 Kelly, supra note 7, at 6.
77 May 1993 Tax Report, supra note 11, at G-6.
78 Id.
79 Weintraub, supra note 39, at C1. The National Commission advocated modern-
izing air traffic control by replacing the FAA with a private corporation. Despite a
favorable response from the Clinton Administration, this proposal has been waylaid
by Congressional hearings studying "less drastic alternatives." Sept. 1994 Tax Re-
port, supra note 7, at J-3 (quoting unnamed members of the House Aviation
Subcommittee).
80 Aug. 1993 Tax Report, supra note 1, at G-2.
81 Id.
82 Weintraub, supra note 39, at C1. Note, however, that "[a] year after it called for
far-reaching policy changes . . . the national airline commission has found that its
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B. THE LEGISLATWVE RESPONSE
The Executive Branch was not the only branch of the
government to recognize and respond to the crisis in the
aviation industry. Interestingly, in the same month the
Commission's report was released, the Aviation Infrastruc-
ture Investment Act of 1993, H.R. 2739,13 came before Con-
gress. The bill's very name illustrates Congress' awareness
of a transportation problem tied to an ailing airline indus-
try and poor airport facilities. The bill would authorize
funds for airport improvement programs over the next
three years.84 The money would go to improve the infra-
structure and management of the nation's airports. 85
Even before H.R. 2739, the repercussions of the crisis in
the air were felt in Congress. Noticing that airport capital
requirements were running more than $2 billion a year
higher than the revenues the federal aviation trust fund was
collecting, Representative Glenn Anderson (D. Calif.) con-
cluded that "[f]ederal funding alone will not be sufficient
to pay for needed airport improvements in the future."86
Consequently, on August, 2, 1990, the House voted 405-15
to give local airport authorities the power to levy up to a
three dollar head tax on travelers.8 7 Then Secretary of
Transportation, Samuel Skinner, called the PFC program "a
primary recommendations have been mostly ignored by Congress." Sept. 1994 Tax
Report, supra note 7, atJ-3. Airline tax relief, for example, never received a congres-
sional hearing in light of improving airline finances and the need to use new reve-
nues to reduce the federal deficit. Id.
83 H.R. 2739, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1993).
Work Remains on Clinton-Backed Bills on Campaign Finance Charges, Other Issues,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 161, at F-10 (Aug. 23, 1993) [hereinafter Activity Report.
8 Id. The report stated that the bill would authorize funds totalling $2.1 billion
for fiscal 1994, $2.16 billion for fiscal 1995 and $2.2 billion for fiscal 1996. Id. "The
bill would raise the minimum funds allotted to small airports by $100,000 to a floor
of $500,000, fund the conversion of 16 military air bases across the country to civil-
ian uses, and prohibit charges passengers pay for using airports-[the PFC]-on
unpaid air transportation, such as frequent-flyer tickets." Id.
- Hess, supra note 66, at N10.
87 Id. It is interesting to note that "[s]hortly before approving the bill, members
voted 252-171 to reject an amendment by Rep. Douglas Bosco (D-Calif.) that would
have killed the head tax and instead used the $7 billion surplus in the federal avia-
tion trust fund to finance airport improvements." Id.
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major step in the effort to increase airport capacity." 8 Pro-
ponents of PFCs also extol their virtues.89 One of the most
frequently cited and obvious advantages of using PFCs to
finance airport improvement projects is that they increase
an airport's revenues in a manner directly proportional to
its traffic growth.9° Moreover, PFCs can easily be increased
or decreased according to funding needs. 91 Finally, PFCs
disentangle airport funding needs from the complications
and vacillations of the federal budget.92
1. Law of PFCs
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended by the Avi-
ation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990, gives the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
(hereinafter FAA) the authority to grant a public agency
that controls a commercial service airport the power to im-
pose a passenger facility charge.9" Under the terms of the
Act, all of the nation's 430 commercial airports are author-
ized to impose the tax. 4 The specific details of PFCs are set
out in the Code of Federal Regulations.95
First, since only the Administrator of the FAA may grant a
public agency that controls an airport the authority to im-
pose a PFC, 96 no agency may impose a PFC without the au-
88 Knutson, supra note 8, at B4.




9- 49 U.S.C. § 1513(e)(1), repealed &y Act of July 5, 1994 Pub. L. No. 103-272,
§ 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (subject matter of this section to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40117).
94 Id. § 1513(e); see also Hess, supra note 66, at N1O. There is one qualification,
however:
[D]epending on how much money they raise, the 71 largest airports
that chose to enact the tax would have to give up a percentage of their
share of the annual allotments from the federal airport improvement
program. In some cases, those airports could lose all their federal aid.
Money not going to the larger airports would be redistributed to the
smaller airports that did not impose the tax.
Hess, supra note 66, at N10.
95 14 C.F.R. § 158 (1991).
- Id. § 158.5.
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thorization of the Administrator.97 A passenger enplaned
at an airport may be charged a PFC of one, two or three
dollars.9 No air carrier may contract with a public agency
that controls an airport to avoid the imposition of PFCs.99
The Administrator will make available a list of carriers and
routes that have been determined by the DOT to be ineligi-
ble for the collection of PFCs.100 In addition, a public
agency in control of an airport may request that PFC collec-
tion not be required of certain carriers if the number of
passengers they enplane constitutes no more than one per-
cent of the total number of passengers enplaned annually
at the airport. 1
The use of PFC revenue and any interest earned on the
revenue is strictly controlled. The revenue may only be
used to finance the allowable costs of approved projects 02
at an airport controlled by a public agency.103 "Allowable
costs" are defined by the Code as "reasonable and necessary
costs of carrying out an approved project including costs
incurred prior to and subsequent to the approval to impose
a PFC," so long as the cost does not date back before No-
vember 5, 1990.104 Allowable costs also include payments
for debt service on bonds.10 5 PFC revenue may be used to
pay all or part of the allowable cost of an approved pro-
ject.0 6 A public agency may also use a combination of PFC
revenue and airport grant funds to finance an approved
project.10 7
In order for the FAA Administrator to find an airport im-
provement project eligible for PFC revenue financing, the
project must: "(1) [p]reserve or enhance safety, security, or
7d.
98 Id.
- Id. § 158.7(b).
00 14 C.F.R. § 158.9(a).
10, Id. § 158.11.
1o See infra text accompanying note 108 for definition of an "approved project."
M0 14 C.F.R. § 158.13.
I- Id. § 158.3.
105 Id.
106 Id. § 158.13(a).
107 Id. § 158.13(c).
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capacity of the national air transportation system; (2)
[r] educe noise or mitigate noise impacts resulting from an
airport; or (3) [f]urnish opportunities for enhanced com-
petition between or among air carriers."108 The Regula-
tions provide several examples of approved airport projects,
including airport noise compatibility planning measures,
certain terminal development, construction of gates and re-
lated areas where passengers are enplaned or deplaned,
and areas related to baggage handling and movement. 1°9
The Regulations also specify the consultation and appli-
cation requirements by which a public agency seeks to ob-
tain approval to impose a PFC and use that revenue on a
project. First, before a public agency submits an applica-
tion to the FAA for authority to impose a PFC and for pro-
ject approval, it must consult with all air carriers operating
at the airport. ° This consultation provision requires that
the public agency provide all air carriers operating at the
airport with written notice describing the projects being
submitted for PFC funding, the PFC amount, the proposed
effective and expiration dates of the PFC, the estimated to-
tal PFC revenue, and the date and location of a meeting at
which the public agency will present the proposed projects
to the air carriers.111 Moreover, at or before the consulta-
tion, the public agency must provide air carriers with a de-
tailed description of the project, an explanation of the
need for the project, including the estimated allowable pro-
ject costs allocated to major project elements, and the antic-
ipated total amount of PFC revenue that will be used as well
as the source and amount of other funds, if any, needed to
finance the project.11 2 For their part, the air carriers must
provide the agency with written acknowledgment of the re-
ceipt of the notice within thirty days."' In addition, within
thirty days following the meeting, each air carrier must pro-
M" 14 C.F.R. § 158.15(a)(1)-(3).
M Id. § 158.15(b)(1)-(6).
l1 Id. § 158.23(a).
I Id. § 158.23(c)(l)-(4).
112 Id.
us 14 C.F.R. § 158.23(c)(1).
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vide the public agency with a written certification of its
agreement or disagreement with the proposed project. 1 4 A
certification of disagreement must list the reasons for disa-
greement or it will be void.11 5 Failure to provide a timely
certification will be considered a certification of
agreement. 116
Next, the application for authority to impose a PFC must
include: the name and address of the public agency; the
name and telephone number of the official submitting the
application; the official name of the airport where the PFC
will be imposed; the official name of the airport where the
project is proposed; a copy of the airport capital plan for
the project to be financed by PFC revenue; a description of
the project; the project justification; the amount of the re-
quested PFC; the proposed charge effective and expiration
date; a summary of consultation with air carriers at the af-
fected airport, which includes a list of air carriers certifying
agreement and disagreement and their reasons why; and a
signed statement certifying that the public agency will com-
ply with all assurances made. 1 7 If a public agency is also
filing a request not to require certain air carriers to impose
the PFC because their passengers make up less than one
percent of the airport's passengers, additional information
is required in the application. 1 8
If the application for authority to impose a PFC is not
accompanied by a concurrent application for project ap-
proval, the application must include: a description of alter-
native methods being considered by the agency to
accomplish the objectives of the project; a description of
alternative uses of the PFC revenue in the event that the
proposed project will not be approved; a timetable for com-
I14 d. § 158.23(c) (2).
15 Id.
116 Id. § 158.23(c)(3).
117 Id. § 158.25(b)(1-11, 15).
ns 14 C.F.R. § 158.25(b)(12). A copy of the information provided to the carriers
and their comments must be submitted in the application as well as a list of carriers
that would not be required to collect a PFC and the agency's reasons for making the
exclusionary request.
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pletion of project formulation activities and submission of
an application for project approval; and a projected date of
project implementation and completion. 119
If the application for authority to impose a PFC is submit-
ted concurrently with an application for project approval,
the project approval application must include all of the in-
formation required in the PFC imposition application and a
signed certificate stating that all environmental reviews
have been completed with respect to the project and that
the final FAA airspace study with respect to the project, if
one is required, has been completed.12 °
An agency may request an extension of time to submit an
application for project approval after the application for au-
thority to impose PFCs has been approved.1 21 The time ex-
tension will be granted if the public agency has shown good
cause for the application delay; the revised schedule for
submitting the application is satisfactory; and further collec-
tion of PFCs during the time extension will not result in
excessive accumulation of revenue.1 2 2
Finally, if an application for project approval is submitted
after the authority to impose a PFC has been granted, the
project approval application must include only the follow-
ing: the name and address of the public agency, the name
and telephone number of the official submitting the appli-
cation; the official name of the airport where the project is
proposed; a copy of the airport capital plan where the PFC-
financed project is proposed; a description of the project
119 Id. § 158.25(b)(14, 15).
- Id. § 158.25(c)(1).
121 Id. § 158.35(a). At least 30 days prior to requesting the extension, the agency
must publish a notice of its intent to request an extension in the local newspaper
and invite public comments. Id. The time extension request must be submitted at
least 120 days before the authority to impose PFCs expires and must be accompa-
nied by: a description of the progress on the project application; a revised schedule
for submitting the application; an explanation of the delay in submitting the appli-
cation; a report showing the total amount of PFC revenue collected to date plus
interest, the projected amount to be collected during the time extension, and any
agency funds used on the project that must be reimbursed; a summary of any fur-
ther consultation with air carriers at the airport; and a summary of public comment.
Id.
122 14 C.F.R. § 158.35(a).
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proposed; the projectjustification; the estimated charge ex-
piration date; a copy of information regarding the financ-
ing of the project that was presented to the carriers during
consultation; a signed statement certifying public agency
compliance with assurances; and a signed certification that
all environmental reviews have been completed and the fi-
nal FAA airspace study is completed, if one was required.'2 3
The Regulations establish a process for review by the FAA
Administrator of all applications. The Administrator must
first review the application for completeness and then ad-
vise the public agency by letter that the application is sub-
stantially complete.12 4  The Administrator must then
publish a notice in the Federal Register stating his intent to
rule on the application and inviting public comment. 25
Anyone interested may file a comment on the application
within thirty days after publication of the notice in the Fed-
eral Register.1 26 Copies of the comments must be submit-
ted to both the FAA Airports office and the public
agency.12 7 The public agency may publish the notice in a
newspaper of general circulation in the airport's area and
must make available for inspection, upon request, a copy of
the application. 12  The Administrator must reach a final
decision on the application no later than 120 days after its
receipt.' 9 If the application is not substantially complete,
the agency has the opportunity to supplement the applica-
tion without penalty.13 0
123 Id.
,24 Id. § 158.27(a)-(c).
1 Id. § 158.27(c). The Federal Register notice must include: the name of the
public agency and the airport where the PFC is to be imposed; a description of the
PFC project, the level of the proposed PFC, the proposed PFC effective and expira-
tion date and the total estimated PFC revenue; the address and telephone number
of the FAA Airports office where the application may be inspected; whether the
application is substantially complete; and the due dates for public comments. Id.
M 14 C.F.R. § 158.27(f).
12 Id. § 158.27(c).
128 Id.
129 Id.
'so Id. If the agency decides not to supplement the application, the Administrator
may review the application and base his final decision on what was actually submit-
ted. Id.
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Rules also govern the Administrator's decision on appli-
cations for authority to impose PFCs and airport project ap-
proval. First, an application to impose a PFC will be
approved only after the Administrator determines that: the
amount and duration of the PFC will not result in revenue
exceeding that necessary to finance the project; the project
will achieve Regulation objectives and meet Regulation cri-
teria; the collection process is reasonable and not arbitrary
or discriminatory; and the public agency is not in violation
of the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990.13' The Ad-
ministrator will then notify the public agency in writing of
the decision and list the PFC level, total approved PFC reve-
nue, duration of authority and earliest permissible charge
effective date.13 2
Second, an application for project approval will be ap-
proved only after the Administrator determines that: the
amount and duration of the PFC will not result in excessive
revenue; the project will achieve Regulation objectives and
meet Regulation criteria; and all requirements pertaining
to airspace studies and the National Environmental Policy
Act 33 have been satisfied.' 3 4 The Administrator will then
give the public agency written notification of the decision
that lists the approved project, PFC level, total approved
PFC revenue, and any limit on the duration of authority to
impose the PFC.13 5
If either application fails to meet its requirements for ap-
proval, the Administrator must notify the public agency in
writing of the reasons for disapproval.1 3 6 The public agency
111 14 C.F.R. § 158.29(a); Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990, 49 U.S.C.
§ 2151, repealed ly Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379
(subject matter of section to be codified generally at 49 U.S.C. §§ 47101-47533). If
the public agency has not applied for project approval concurrently with the applica-
tion for authority to impose a PFC, the Administrator must also determine that
there are alternative uses for the PFC revenue in case the proposed project is not
approved. 14 C.F.R. § 158.29(c).
132 Id. § 158.29(a).
1" 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
is 14 C.F.R. § 158.29(b).
135 Id.
"1 Id. § 158.29(c).
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may reapply by following the same procedures as it followed
originally. 137 The Administrator must publish a monthly
notice of all PFC approvals and disapprovals in the Federal
Register. 38
An agency that has commenced an approved project may
impose a PFC until the charge expiration date is reached;
until the total PFC revenue collected plus interest equals
the allowable cost of the approved project; until the author-
ity to collect the PFC is terminated by the Administrator; or
if the agency is found to be in violation of the Airport Noise
and Capacity Act of 1990.139 If an agency has not imple-
mented the approved project, it may not impose a PFC be-
yond the lesser of two years after project approval or five
years after the charge effective date. 41 If, in the Adminis-
trator's judgment, the public agency has not made suffi-
cient progress toward implementing the approved project,
PFC termination proceedings may begin. 14 Moreover, the
authority to impose a PFC will automatically expire after a
specified time period. 42
After notification to carriers, a public agency may, with-
out approval by the FAA, decrease the PFC level collected
from each passenger, decrease the total PFC revenue, or
increase the total PFC revenue by fifteen per cent or less.143
Furthermore, if there is no carrier disagreement, an ap-
proved PFC may be amended to increase the level collected
from each passenger, increase the total approved PFC reve-
nue by more than fifteen percent, materially alter the scope
of an approved project, or establish a new group of exempt
carriers, unless the FAA Administrator notifies the agency
"37 Id.
-5 Id. § 158.29(d).
1 14 C.F.R. § 158.31(a)-(d).
' Id. § 158.33(a).
141 Id. § 158.33(c).
142 Id. This time period is three years after the charge effective date unless: an
application for project approval is pending before the FAA; a project approval appli-
cation has been approved; or a time extension to submit an application for project
approval has been granted. Otherwise, the time period is five years after the charge
effective date unless the agency has obtained project approval. Id.
- 14 C.F.R. § 158.37(a).
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otherwise." In the event of carrier disagreement, the
agency may request that the Administrator approve the pro-
posed amendment.1 45
In the event that collected PFC revenue, plus interest, ex-
ceeds the allowable cost of a project, provisions have been
made for excess funds. 146 The funds will be used for ap-
proved projects or retirement of outstanding PFC-financed
bonds.1 47 Within thirty days of expiration or termination of
the authority to impose PFCs, the agency must present a
plan to the FAA for using accumulated PFC revenue. If the
agency fails to submit a plan or if the plan is unacceptable
to the FAA, the Administrator offsets federal airport grant
program apportioned funds.1 48
After approval of the application for authority to impose
a PFC, the agency notifies the air carriers that they are re-
quired to collect PFCs.149 Each carrier then notifies its
agents of the collection requirement.15 0  The air carriers
are responsible for PFC funds from the time of collection to
remittance. 51 The agents must note as a separate item on
each ticket the total amount of PFCs the passenger will pay
and the airports for which the PFCs are collected. 152 Re-
strictions are placed on the amount of PFCs that may be
collected on each passenger's complete itinerary. 153
PFC revenue funds are collected by the carriers and must
be accounted for by them, although PFC revenue may be
commingled with the carriers' other sources of revenue. 5 4
The PFC revenue is regarded as trust funds held by the car-
1- Id. § 158.37(b)(1).
145 Id.
140 Id. § 158.39(a).
147 Id.
-4 14 C.F.R. § 158.39(d).
'- Id. § 158.43(a).
150 Id.
15, Id. § 158.45(a)(1).
112 Id. § 158.45(b).
1- 14 C.F.R. § 158.45(c). For each one-way trip on an itinerary, air carriers may
only collect a PFC from a passenger for the first two airports where PFCs are im-
posed. For each round trip, a PFC may only be collected for enplanements at the
first and last two enplaning airports where PFCs are imposed. Id.
154 Id. § 158.49(b).
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iers for the public agencies, in which the carriers have a
possessory but not an equitable interest. 155 PFCs must be
remitted to the agency monthly.5 6 As compensation for
collecting, handling, and remitting the PFC revenue, the
air carriers receive twelve cents of each PFC remitted on or
before June 28, 1994, and eight cents of each PFC remitted
thereafter, as well as any interest earned on PFC revenue
between the time of collection and remittance.'5 7
The Regulations also require extensive reporting be-
tween the carrier and the agency.'5 8 The public agency
provides quarterly reports to the collecting carriers, which
include PFC revenue received from the carriers, interest
earned, expenditures, and the amount committed for use
on approved projects. 59 The public agency must keep re-
mitted PFC revenue either separately or with other agency
airport capital funds in an interest bearing account.16 The
agency must maintain an accounting record for each PFC
funded approved project that identifies the PFC revenue re-
ceived, the amount of interest earned, and the amounts
used on each project.1 61 The agency must also provide for
an annual audit of its PFC account. 162
For their part, each collecting carrier files a quarterly re-
port with the public agency, which includes the total PFC
revenue collected, the total PFC revenue refunded to pas-
sengers, and reimbursement of expenses for collecting and
handling. 63 Collecting carriers must maintain an account-
ing record for the public agency that identifies the airport
where passengers were enplaned and establishes the
amount of collected, remitted and refunded PFC reve-
155 Id.
M Id. § 158.51.
157 14 C.F.R. § 158.53.
M Id. § 158.63(a).
159 Id.
16 Id. § 158.67(a).
lot Id. § 158.67(b).
'6' 14 C.F.R. § 158.67(c).
"' Id. § 158.65.
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nue.164 Any carrier that collects more than $50,000 in PFCs
annually must have an annual audit of its PFC account.16 -
Collecting PFC revenue may affect other federal funding
at an airport. For example, if the FAA Administrator deter-
mines that PFC revenue is excessive or not being properly
used, the Administrator may reduce the amount of federal
airport grant funds to the airport.166 In addition, federal
funds apportioned to an agency under the Airport and Air-
way Improvement Act of 1982167 are automatically reduced
if that airport enplanes more than 0.25 per cent of the total
annual United States enplanements and the public agency
imposes a PFC at that airport. 168
It is also noteworthy that an airport's failure to comply
with the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 will termi-
nate its eligibility for grant funds and authority to impose
PFCs.169 Termination of PFCs because of an airport's viola-
tion of the Noise Act is the result of Congressional findings
that:
[A]viation noise management is crucial to the continued in-
crease in airport capacity; community noise concerns have
led to uncoordinated and inconsistent restrictions on avia-
tion which could impede the national air transportation sys-
tem; a noise policy must be implemented at the national
level; local interest in aviation noise management shall be
considered in determining the national interest; community
concerns can be alleviated through the use of new technol-
ogy aircraft and the use of revenues, including those avail-
able from [PFCs;] . . . and revenues derived from a [PFC]
may be applied to noise management and increased airport
capacity. 17
4 Id. § 158.69(a).
1 Id. § 158.69(b).
- Id. § 158.87(a).
1- 49 U.S.C. § 2201, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),
108 Stat. 1379 (subject matter of section to be codified generally at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 47101-47533).
- 14 C.F.R. § 158.93.
-e 14 C.F.R. § 161.501.
-7 49 U.S.C. § 2151, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),
108 Stat. 1379 (subject matter of section to be codified generally at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 47101-47533).
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2. The Response to PFCs.
In general, the United States government has responded
favorably to PFCs while the airline industry has urged their
repeal. House Public Works and Transportation Commit-
tee Chairman Norman Mineta said that "since 1990, PFCs
have proven themselves to be a major source of capital fi-
nancing at airports."17' Transportation Subcommittee
Chairman Bob Carr, however, favors either repealing or
modifying the law that allows airports to collect PFCs be-
cause he is concerned that PFCs make significantly less
money available for the aviation programs that his commit-
tee oversees. 172  Carr said that now, with almost all airlines
losing large sums of money, "we should take a very serious
look at repealing [the law that allows PFCs]."173 At the very
least, Carr suggests that PFC-financed projects should be
approved by the FAA only if all the airlines at the affected
airports support them.1 74
Mineta supports the law as written, asserting that it is
enough that the FAA vigorously scrutinize PFC applications
to ascertain whether the projects meet the criteria spelled
out by law. 175 Mineta even advocates one step more than
the law currently allows, arguing that airports should use
PFCs for ground access projects such as rail systems in addi-
tion to on site airport expansion.' 7
6
The airline industry has sharply criticized the law al-
lowing airport imposition of PFCs and has urged its re-
peal.1 77 In fact, top executives in the airline industry asked
the members of President Clinton's Commission studying
the airline industry to repeal the airports' authority to col-
171 May 1993 Tax Report, supra note 11, at G-6.
7 Airlines Seek Relif ftom Ticket Tax, Question Energy Tax at House Heating, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at G-9 (Mar. 11, 1993) (hereinafter Mar. 1993 Tax Report]
(discussing airline industry's desire for tax relief).
17 Id. at G-10.
174 Id.
175 May 1993 Tax Report, supra note 11, at &.6.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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lect PFCs. 178 The airlines oppose PFCs because, in order to
remain competitive, airlines themselves sometimes elect to
pay the PFC fees.' 79 In 1991, this choice cost the industry
$1.2 billion.180 For instance, airline officials at Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport (DFW) were concerned about
the proposed PFCs because they feared that they would be
unable to pass the PFC cost along to passengers as Congress
intended and instead be forced to absorb the extra costs in
order to stay competitive. 181 Patricia Goldman, USAir's se-
nior vice president for corporate relations, expressed the
same concerns, citing PFCs "as an example of an enormous
number of regulations that have significant costs attached
and significantly impact our bottom line."182 Taking the
position of the airline industry, Darryl Wyland, senior vice
president of the American Automobile Association, said his
organization "continues to oppose the entire concept of
PFCs as an excessive tax burden on air travelers and a finan-
cial burden on airlines." 8 '
Although the airline industry lost its bid to repeal the law
authorizing PFCs when Clinton's commission studying the
industry recommended continued close scrutiny of airport
proposals to collect PFCs, one concession was made. 84
One major complaint of the airline industry had been the
collection of PFCs from travelers with frequent-flier tickets.
The DOT had argued, in support of the collection, that the
fee benefits all users of the airport alike and should there-
fore apply to all users. 85 Supporting the DOT assertion is
the fact that frequent fliers must pay customs and immigra-
178 Airline Commission Urged to Recommend Tax, Regulatory Relieffor U.S. Carriers, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 106, at G-3 (June 4, 1993) [hereinafterJune 1993 Tax Report].
1 Martin Tolchin, Government Turns Attention to Ailing Airlines, DAILY NEws OF
L.A., Dec. 28, 1992, at B4.
180 Id.
- Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Wants Fee For New Runways Departing Passengers Might
Face $3 Charge, Hous. POST, July 4, 1993, at A31 [hereinafter DFWAirport Wants Fee].
182 Tolchin, supra note 179, at B4.
- Aug. 1993 Tax Report, supra note 1, at G-2.
184 Id.
-s Travel Can Be Taxing, US Airports Sock Passengers, CONSUMER REP. TRAvEL LET-
TER, Oct. 1992, at 109 [hereinafter Travel Can Be Taxing].
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tion fees on international travel.186 The airlines challenged
the DOT's position, claiming that frequent-flier trips
should be free of PFCs and ticket charges.'8 7 The industry
will likely prevail on this point since the Aviation Infrastruc-
ture Investment Act of 1993188 would prohibit the collec-
tion of PFCs on unpaid air transportation, such as frequent-
flier tickets. 189
Individual airports have responded in overwhelming
numbers to the law authorizing PFCs. Savannah, Georgia,
was the first airport to receive approval to impose PFCs
under the new program.190 The Savannah Airport Commis-
sion was authorized to charge each departing passenger
three dollars. 9' The FAA has said that the Savannah Air-
port hopes to raise $3 million a year to finance $39.5 mil-
lion in improvements, including a new passenger terminal,
a new aircraft parking apron, taxiways, and new entrance
and service roads. 192  As of March 1992, New York, Chi-
cago, Baltimore, Phoenix, Las Vegas, Cleveland, Denver,
and Honolulu had either passed, or were considering,
PFCs. 193 ByJuly 1992, sixty airports had applied to the DOT
for permission to impose a head tax on passengers passing
through, and twenty-five had received approval to do so. 194
As of this same date, the largest dollar amount approved for
PFC funding was $2.3 billion toward the construction of
Denver's new airport. The largest amounts awaiting ap-
proval were $6.4 billion for John F. Kennedy, La Guardia,
and Newark airports and $1.6 billion for a variety of
projects at Detroit Metro.' 95 Amazingly, as of October
186 Id.
187 Id.
1- See H.R. 2739, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1993).
18 Activity Report, supra note 84, at F-10.
190 First Air Passenger Fee OK'd, Hous. POST, Feb. 1, 1992, at C2.
191 Id.
192 Id.
190 Thomas Turcol, Council Panel Oks Airport Tax; PHILA. INQUiRER, Mar. 5, 1992, at
B2.
194 See Travel Can Be Taxing, supra note 185.
185 Id.
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1993, more than 145 airports had received approval to col-
lect approximately $8.2 billion in PFCs.196
Since the law authorizing PFCs became effective in 1990,
many airports have successfully applied for and collected
PFCs for approved airport improvement projects. For ex-
ample, in Chicago, a proposed PFC on departing passen-
gers at O'Hare and Midway airports is expected to generate
$90 million a year to help pay to move military units from
O'Hare and increase the size of the airport.1 97 A $3 PFC on
departing passengers at Philadelphia International Airport
took effect in July 1992.198 The PFC is designed to raise an
estimated $65 million over three years to help fund airport
improvements. 199 The airport has announced a $279 mil-
lion building program to make the facility easier for both
people and airplanes to use. The project calls for a new
$214 million runway, an $8 million commuter-airline termi-
nal and a $57 million renovation of USAir's aging facili-
ties.20 0 Federal funds and bonds issued by the city and paid
off with revenue from the airlines and airport concession-
aires would make up the difference between total airport
improvement costs and the revenue expected to be raised
by PFCs.20 1 Philadelphia Councilwoman Happy Fernandez
has praised the PFC program as "a reasonable way to pro-
vide a capital improvement budget for the cash-starved
city," allowing Philadelphia to do what other airports are
doing.202 Fernandez believes that PFCs are the perfect solu-
tion to airport funding problems, being both painless to
consumers and profitable for airports. 0 In her view, "if
196 FAA Okays Extension of Passenger Fee at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, U.S.
Dep't Transp., News Release, Oct. 25, 1993, available at 1993 WL 436370 (D.O.T.).
19 Gary Washburn, City Weighs Plan to Create More Room at O'Hare, CHI. TRIB., OCL
23, 1992, at 1.
- Turcol, supra note 193, at B2.
199 Id.
2- Tom Belden, Plan Calls for Airport Upgrades The $279 Million Project, Announced
by US Air and the City, Would Add a Runway and Commuter-Airline Terminal, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 25, 1993, at Al.
201 Id.
202 Turcol, supra note 193, at B2.
202 Id.
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people have enough money to fly, an extra $3 won't make
that much of a difference."
20 4
Aviation officials in cities without PFCs are giving them
serious consideration. John Solomon, deputy director for
Houston's aviation department, views the possible collec-
tion of PFCs favorably, saying "it would give us the vehicle
to accumulate funds to use for development purposes with-
out having to go through the federal bureaucracy to obtain
them."2 15 Solomon said that a $1 tax for each passenger
leaving Houston could generate about $8 million annually
for Houston Intercontinental Airport and about $4 million
annually for Hobby Airport.20 6 In Dallas, DFW officials had
been opposed to PFCs since they had sufficient federal
funding and airline support for airport improvement
projects.20 7 In August 1993, however, DFW applied to the
FAA for authority to impose a $3 PFC on departing passen-
gers. 0 s Vernell Sturns, the airport's executive director, said
the PFC will raise about $60 million a year and should be
needed for "probably no more than three years to help pay
the $315 million for the east runway. "209
C. THE PRiVATE SECTOR RESPONSE" PFC BATTLES [N Los
ANGELES AND DENVER
1. Los Angeles
In the wake of the Los Angeles riots, city officials began
searching for funds with which to rebuild their ravaged city
and provide more police and fire service to its citizens. The
city faced a budget deficit and only received aid from Con-
gress over heavy opposition, which included "no" votes by
members from Orange County and Long Beach, Califor-
- Id.
205 Lewis, supra note 64, at A13.
20 Id.
2-7 DFW Airport Wants Fee, supra note 181, at A31.
- D-FW Proposes Passengers Help Foot Bill for New Runway, Hous. PosT, Aug. 29,
1993, at A22.
209 Id.
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nia.1 0 The Bush Administration responded to the city's di-
lemma by sending Vice President Dan Quayle to meet with
Mayor Tom Bradley to discuss the possibility of selling Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX) to raise the money to
rebuild the riot-torn city.211 The sale of the airport to a pri-
vate operator would have raised more than $1 billion, but
the city's response to President Bush's proposal was hostile.
Many argued that selling a long term asset to finance a one-
time expense is not sound business judgment.21 2
City Councilwoman Ruth Galanter, whose district in-
cluded the airport, advocated an easier solution to finding
funds. "We don't have to sell the airport .... [A]l the
President has to do is sign an order giving us greater access
to the airport's revenue. "213 Galanter proposed a measure
to the City Council to allow the city to use airport revenue,
including money collected from PFCs, to provide addi-
tional police, firefighters and paramedics for the city.21 4 In
May, 1992, the city passed Galanter's proposal and voted
unanimously to draft a city charter amendment that would
permit airport revenue to be spent throughout the city for
general services. 3  The amendment was placed on the bal-
lot in November, 1992, as Proposition K.
Proposition K proposed to amend the city charter in or-
der to allow airport funds to be placed in the city's treasury.
Proposition K also proposed to include provisions to pre-
serve some surplus revenue for use at the airports. 6 Since
World War II, the city charter had required that all funds
raised at the city-owned airports be used at the airport for
maintenance and operations. 7 Galanter said the city char-
ter restrictions were approved when the financial success of




21- LA Officials Criticize Plan to Sell Airport, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1992, at A16.
214 Rainey, supra note 13, at B3.
21- James Rainey, Study Says City Would Gain by Keeping LAX L.A. TIMES, May 28,
1992, at Al.
216 Rainey, supra note 13, at B3.
217 Id.
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LAX was uncertain.2 1 8 Now that the airport's stability is as-
sured, Galanter argued that the city should be able to bene-
fit from its investment in the airport.219  She then
introduced another proposal to the city council to restrict
the use of airport revenue to hiring more police, firefight-
ers, and paramedics. 22 0 Galanter estimated that the reve-
nue diversion would allow the city to hire 800 police
officers, 108 paramedics, and 60 firefighters.2
Proposition K proponents described the measure as a
logical way for residents to benefit from the airport's cash
surplus, which was more than $25 million in 1991 and was
projected to grow by as much as $70 million a year.222 Pro-
ponents also argued that diversion of funds from the air-
port to the city treasury would provide much needed
money for city services while keeping the airport and its
base value in public hands.223
City officials were among the proponents of Proposition
K. They backed the proposition because of their dissatisfac-
tion with the city's inability to recapture more money from
the semi-independent airport agency due to FAA restric-
tions.224 It is no wonder that city officials have turned an
envious eye toward LAX. The airport took in $215 million
in 1991 from automobile parking, sales of food, drink, and
magazines, and from airline fees for landing and cargo.225
After expenses of $187 million for maintenance and other
purposes, LAX showed a surplus of $27 million.2 26 The pos-
sibility of PFC revenue only made the idea of diverting
money from the airport more appealing.
The airline industry led the opposition to the diversion of




-1 Rainey, supra note 13, at B3.
222 Id.
22 Rainey, supra note 215, at Al.
24 See Flanigan, supra note 210, at D1.
225 Id.
2- Id.
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argued that passage of Proposition K would drive up prices
at the airport on everything from airline tickets to airport
food concessions and would diminish airport maintenance
and improvements.2 27 Roger Cohen, Vice President for
Government Affairs of the Air Transportation Association,
said "the airport is the one thing in the city that works ....
It has been run like a business and at no taxpayer expense.
Proposition K represents the final blow in politicization of
the airport."2 8 Cohen feared that, under Proposition K,
city officials would use their power to review Airport Com-
mission decisions to increase terminal rents, concession
fees, and airline landing charges in order to bolster the
funds in the city treasury. These costs would, of course,
have to be passed on to consumers, thereby possibly de-
creasing the number of airline patrons.229
Proposition K was the costliest campaign of the four bal-
lot measures in the November, 1992, election.230 One air-
line trade association spent $241,000 to defeat the
measure. 23 1 Airline officials spent $256,000 to defeat Prop-
osition K, six times the budget for "the Yes on K" cam-
paign. 2  City Councilwoman Ruth Galanter accused the
airlines' campaign of "trying to distract voters from the pri-
mary issue - that airports are public facilities and the pub-
lic should decide how to spend the revenue. "233
Proposition K prevailed, but with just over fifty percent of
the vote.2 3 4 The passing of Proposition K, however, was just
the first step toward diverting airport funds. The 1990 law
authorizing airports to impose PFCs specifically prohibits
' Rainey, supra note 13, at B3.
"'Z Id.
" Id.
2- James Rainey, 911 Tax Leading; Proposition N Falling Short, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1992, 'at A3.
231 Id.
232 Rainey, supra note 13, at B3.
253 Id.
2 James Rainey, Police Plan Loses But Officials Are Upbeat, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992,
at B1.
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the use of airport money for non-aviation purposes.235
Thus, even after passage of Proposition K, at least two other
changes would be needed: revisions in federal law that re-
quires airport revenues to be spent at airports and modifi-
cations of bonds sold to build LAX, which include the same
restrictions. 36 The city's negotiations with the FAA and
Congress to change the prohibitions in the 1990 PFC law to
allow airport revenue to be used for city purposes have re-
cently proved unsuccessful. In response to Proposition K's
passage, Congressional legislation reauthorizing the federal
airport grant program contained a provision requiring the
"Transportation Department to issue rules that prohibit rev-
enue diversion for non-airport purposes."
23 7
2. Denver
Denver is another city in which PFCs have had a tremen-
dous impact. Unlike in Los Angeles, PFCs in Denver have
not been the object of an avaricious battle for their use, but
they have been the focal point of what could be an eco-
nomic disaster.
When the federal government authorized the collection
of PFCs, Denver city officials saw an opportunity to build a
new, modern airport without using a penny of local taxes.
The new airport "would be as close as one gets to a free
lunch" and would be financed entirely by the passengers of
airlines that would use it.238 Economic planners envisaged
the new airport as a panacea for a region that had been
suffering a depression for five years. Economists reasoned
that the airport would be a modern day version of the nine-
teenth century rail crossroad that would attract new compa-
nies, financial centers, and trade, thereby reducing the
- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(e) (2) (B), repealed by Act ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. 103-272,
§ 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (subject matter of this section to be codified generally at 49
U.S.C. § 40117).
2- Rainey, supra note 215, at Al.
237 Sept. 1994 Tax Report, supra note 7, at J5.
2" Mike McPhee, Continental Bankruptcy Threatens Hopes for New Denver Airport,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 1990, at H2.
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region's dependence on oil and mineral exploration.239 In
addition, the new airport promised an estimated 25,000 to
30,000 jobs.2 °
Relying on the newly authorized PFCs, construction be-
gan in 1989 on the new $2.3 billion Denver International
Airport, designed to be seven times larger than the existing
Stapleton International Airport. The airport, which is
"[s] et on fifty-three square miles [and includes] five run-
ways and a state-of-the-art automated baggage handling sys-
tem, . . . quickly became the largest public works project in
America."2 41 So caught up were city officials, however, in
the ability to spend PFC revenue to benefit the local econ-
omy that they failed to notice the obvious. The crisis of the
airline industry had taken its toll on Denver's existing air-
port, as it had on the airports of every other city in the na-
tion. Air traffic into Stapleton had declined twenty percent
in just four years.242 Moreover, one of five concourses at
Stapleton had been shut down for lack of use.243 Despite
these figures, construction began as planned.
Major airline cooperation is critical for the new airport's
success since it is financed entirely by PFCs on resident air-
lines' tickets. PFCs at Denver will be at least $19 per passen-
ger.244 This dollar figure is enough to make many airlines
balk. Indeed, airport costs are so high that "Continental
has nearly pulled out of Denver as a hub, reducing its
flights from 180 a day to about twenty-two." 245 Unless ma-
jor airlines are financially able to commit to Denver Inter-
national Airport, the first new airport in the United States
in fifteen years, and one financed entirely by PFCs, will be a




241 Peter S. Greenberg, Denver's White Elephant May Finally Manage to Fly, MiAmi
HERALD, Nov. 27, 1994, at 5F.
242 McPhee, supra note 238, at H2.
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2- Greenberg, supra note 241, at 5F.
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D. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
In early 1994, one appellate court interpreted the regula-
tions regarding PFCs. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. FAA,246
Northwest sought review of the FAA's decision to approve
the airport's application to collect PFCs. Northwest argued
three claims. First, Northwest asserted that the FAA should
have considered the negative effect of a PFC on Northwest's
ability to compete with other airlines at hubs that do not
impose PFCs. In support, Northwest cited the "PFC statute
[that] directs the FAA to approve PFCs only for eligible air-
port-related projects which will - (i) preserve or enhance
capacity, safety, or security... (ii) reduce noise.., or (iii)
furnish opportunities for enhanced competition between
or among air carriers."247 The court adopted the FAA read-
ing of the statute that allows the FAA to approve any project
that meets at least one of the three criteria.2 48
Next, Northwest argued that the FAA should not approve
alternative projects or, in the alterative, that the FAA should
not have approved this PFC application because the airport
failed to consult with the airline regarding the alternative
project before submitting its application. The court found
that FAA approval for alternative uses was intended by Con-
gress because the "regulations require that airport authori-
ties... before seeking authority to use the PFC funds must
provide the FAA with a description of alternative PFC-eligi-
ble uses."249 The court agreed with Northwest, however, on
its last claim and found that the airport violated regulations
requiring consultation before submission of an applica-
tion.25 Thus, at least one appellate court has strictly con-
strued the regulations governing PFC collection.
Most of the decisions that have addressed the Federal
Aviation and Administration Act,251 however, have focused
2- 14 F.3d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
247 Id. at 68.
24 Id. at 69.
24 Id. at 71.
2- Id. at 72.
21 49 U.S.C. § 1513, r0ealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat. 1379 (subject matter to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40120).
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on section 1513(a) rather than section 1513(e), which
granted airport agencies the authority to impose PFCs.2 52
Section 1513(a) of the FAA Act is called the Anti-Head Tax
Act (hereinafter AHTA).253 The AHTA prohibits local and
state taxes "on persons traveling in air commerce or on the
carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the sale
of air transportation."2 5 4 An exception is created, however,
for collecting "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and
other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of
airport facilities." 255 The AHTA was originally enacted in
1973 in response to a decision by the Supreme Court in
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Air-
lines.2 56 In Evansville the Court held that neither the Com-
merce Clause nor the Airport and Airway Development Act
of 197027 precluded the imposition of state and local head
taxes on air travellers. 2 8 Two years before the Evansville de-
cision, Congress had passed both the Airport and Airway
Development Act and the Airport and Airway Revenue Act
of 1970259 to improve air transportation.2 6 0 The 1970 acts
sought to finance airport improvements through the Air-
port and Airway Trust Fund, which accumulated funds by
levying various federal taxes on air users.2 61 Thus, after Ev-
ansville, Congress enacted the AHTA out of concern over
resentment against state and local head taxes in light of the
federal government's existing collection of taxes from air
212 Salem Transp. Co. of N.J., Inc. v. Port Auth., 611 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
2- 49 U.S.C. § 1513(a), repealed byAct ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),
108 Stat. 1379 (subject matter of this section to be codified generally at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40116).
254 Id.
21- Id. § 1513(b).
2 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
2-57 Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.).
- Id. at 721.
- Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 4
U.S.C., 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
2- City & County of Denver v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 834, 837
(D. Colo. 1989).
261 Id.
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users.262 The AHTA ensured that double taxation on air
users did not occur. 63 As an immediate result of the
AHTA, a local Philadelphia passenger head tax of two dol-
lars was declared constitutionally invalid.26
The AITA recently has been invoked by airlines to con-
test airport allocation of user fees. In Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. County of Kent, Michigan265 seven airlines alleged that the
airport's failure to allocate airfield costs to airport conces-
sionaires overcharged them in violation of the AHTA. The
Supreme Court stated that the prohibition on local head
taxes is modified by a savings clause in the act that permits
"reasonable rental charges ... from aircraft operators for
the use of airport facilities." 266 The Court used the Evans-
ville reasonableness standard: "a levy is reasonable if ... it
(1) is based on some fair approximation of use of the facili-
ties, (2) is not excessive in relation to the benefits con-
ferred, and (3) does not discriminate against interstate
commerce."2 67 The airport's allocation scheme of charging
the concessionaires market value rental for terminal space
but no airfield costs and charging the airlines cost-based
rental for terminal space and airfield costs was found rea-
sonable under the Evansville test.2 68 Thus, the AHTA re-
quires reasonableness, not perfection, when airports
allocate user fees to their tenants.
Approximately five years earlier, in Denver v. Continental
Air Lines,269 the airport was allowed to use income derived
from rental charges and fees on its tenant restaurants, gift
shops, and rental car outlets to help finance its replacement
airport for Stapleton. The AHTA did not apply to the ten-
ant concessionaires because air passengers were not "re-
quired to park in the parking lot, rent a car, eat at a
"8 Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 838.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 309 A.2d 157, 159 (Pa. 1973).
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restaurant or buy a magazine."2 7' The AHTA did, however,
prohibit Denver from assessing resident Stapleton airlines
higher rental charges to finance its new airport. Because
the AHTA prohibits local taxation of air passengers except
where the charges are necessary to operate existing airport
facilities, 271 Denver was not permitted to locally tax air com-
merce in order to finance an airport facility that was not yet
built.272 The addition of section 1513(e), which granted
airport agencies the authority to impose PFCs, has been a
means for airports like Denver to finance capital improve-
ments and new facilities without running afoul of the
prohibitions against state and local taxation of air passen-
gers engaged in air transportation.
III. EFFECTS OF PFCS ON THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
AND TRANSPORTATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Since PFCs now appear to be a permanent feature of air
travel, the remaining question is how PFCs will affect the
airline industry and United States transportation. Barring a
successful lobbying effort by Los Angeles that would allow
PFC revenue to be used for purposes unrelated to airport
improvement projects, three major problem areas currently
exist in which PFC revenue could play a major role. These
problem areas are airline competition, airline concentra-
tion, and airport capacity.
A. COMPETITION
Lack of competition among individual airlines at airports
and on specific routes is causing stagnation in the airline
industry. Many analysts recommend that the industry open
up to new carriers and allow competition and free market
forces to breathe new life into the ailing industry. The
chief obstacle to new carrier competition in the airline in-
270 Id. at 838.
271 Id. at 839.
27 Id. at 839-40.
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dustry is the exclusive use, long term lease agreement with a
majority in interest (hereinafter MII) clause between an air-
line and an airport. 73 The long term lease agreements are
rewards that individual airlines receive from airports for
helping fund most airport construction. Airlines view the
long term lease agreements as a return on their invest-
ment.274 Not only do the leases have long lease periods, but
the agreements place restrictions on other airport facility
leasing. In addition, these leases usually contain MII
clauses that give the airline substantial control over compe-
tition from other airlines at any particular airport. MIT
clauses give airlines power that ranges from the right to
veto expansion at an airport, to the right to approve large
capital projects, to the ability to adjust landing fees or ter-
minal rental fees, to the right to approve bond sales to raise
capital for new construction.275
Before deregulation, the CAB controlled airline routes
and fares at all airports and thus curtailed the possibility of
airlines abusing their restrictive lease provisions and squeez-
ing out competitors.276 Deregulation, however, removed
CAB restraints and opened the door for incumbent airlines
to use their restrictive lease provisions to immunize them-
selves from competition.2 " Specifically, incumbent airlines
used their restrictive lease agreements to acquire exclusive,
long term use of boarding gates and take-off and landing
slots at airports.2 7 8 This monopoly of airport facilities
makes it impossible for new carriers to launch competing
services at incumbent controlled airports and drive prices
down.2 79  Instead of simply raising ticket prices to
supracompetitive levels, incumbent airlines may choose to
sell landing slots at high premiums since they are free to
-s See Note, supra note 3, at 548.
-4 Id. at 561.
- Id. at 549-50.
26 Id. at 550.
- Id.
78 See On a Wing, supra note 2, at SI0.
2" Id.
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own, buy, or sell take-off and landing slots.28 0 Rather than
selling a slot, some incumbents opt to sublease at exorbi-
tant costs. 21 No matter how the incumbents decide to max-
imize profits and minimize competition at airport facilities,
the incumbents next use the MII clauses in their restrictive
lease agreements to veto airport expansion, thus forestall-
ing the ability of new carriers to set up berths in the ex-
panded airport.28 2
The result of these agreements is that incumbent airline
anticompetitive pricing is preserved. Studies indicate that
airlines controlling a substantial share of an airport's facili-
ties will charge higher prices per mile to and from that air-
port than they charge at airports where they do not control
a substantial amount of facilities. 2 ' 3 In fact, fares from fif-
teen airports that are dominated by one or two established
airlines were found to be twenty percent higher than those
fares from airports with more competitor carriers.284
Exclusive use lease agreements with MII clauses are ex-
tremely widespread among our nation's airports. As of
1990, fifty-five airports in the United States functioned with
MII clauses.285 This figure includes fifteen of the twenty-
seven largest United States airports.28 6 To make matters
worse for airline competition, most of the leases at these
airports are for exclusive use over a twenty to thirty year
period.287 Currenly, more than half of all leased airport
gates are covered by agreements that will not expire for
more than a decade. Some leases will not expire until the
year 2015.288
2 0 Paul S. Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in Transportation: Monopoly Is the Name
of the Game, 21 GA. L. REv. 505, 594 (1987) (arguing that the DOT's willingness to
approve airline mergers will result in airline monopolies).
281 See Note, supra note 3, at 562.
282 Id. at 552.
285 Id. at 551-52.
2- See On a Wing, supra note 2, at S10.
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The competition barrier against new carriers is almost in-
surmountable. One airline controls at least sixty percent of
the enplanements at twenty-two United States airports.289
At fourteen large airports, two airlines control as much as
eighty-five percent of all airline enplanements. 2 90 The re-
sult for prospective competitor airlines is harsh. Sixty-eight
percent of our leading airports have no terminal space
available for new entrants. 291 The message for potential
new carriers and consumers is clear: "the infrastructure at
the nation's most attractive hubs has by now been locked
up by the megacarriers and can only be secured at exorbi-
tant prices or through expensive litigation." 92
Despite the prospective benefits of lower prices for con-
sumers, more carriers with better service and a healthy,
competitive airline industry, the major airlines are not will-
ing to relinquish exclusive use lease agreements. Major air-
lines offer three basic defenses for the restrictive leases:
First, incumbent airlines argue that the leases result from
arm's-length negotiations with the airport and therefore are
not anticompetitive. Second, they argue that the leases en-
sure them a return on their investment in the airport facility
and that a rule allowing airports to raise rental fees to subsi-
dize expansion would allow new entrants to be "free riders"
on the incumbents' initial investment. Third, airlines ar-
gue that the hub system is efficient and that a reallocation
of gates would reduce efficiency. 29
Despite the unwillingness of incumbent airlines to abandon
restrictive lease agreements, PFCs may offer a solution to
the problem of how to increase new carrier competition
with established airlines.
Under the PFC application system, no incumbent airline
has flat veto power over proposed airport capital projects.
Once PFC revenue collection is approved by the FAA, each
289 Id.
2WId.
291 Dempsey, supra note 280, at 594.
Id. at 595.
- See Note, supra note 3, at 561 (citations omitted).
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airline at an airport must collect and remit the tax. Avail-
able PFC revenue will make airport expansion projects pos-
sible despite incumbent airline recalcitrance. This added
capacity at newly expanded airports built with PFC revenue
will spur competition among the airlines. 94 With PFC reve-
nue, airports will no longer be dependent upon individual
airlines to approve and finance capital projects. As such,
exclusive use lease agreements will not be necessary to re-
ward airlines for investing in new airport facilities. In the
words of former United States Secretary of Transportation
Samuel Skinner, PFC revenue would allow new airlines to
enter the market by barring exclusive long term lease ar-
rangements in airports that are paid for by the fees.295
B. CONCENTRATION
The current lack of competition in the airline industry by
new carriers, which has been exacerbated by incumbent air-
lines, has fueled another problem area in air travel: concen-
tration. Single airline concentration at individual airports is
the result of two features of United States air travel - lack
of competition between established and new carriers and
deregulation. The preceding section discussed how the in-
cumbent airlines have used long term exclusive use lease
arrangements to preserve their monopoly at individual air-
ports and ensure anticompetitive pricing.296 Since airline
passengers generally desire round trip tickets between two
cities and since there are rarely more than a few airlines
that compete on any given route, concentration in any one
geographical area is usually extremely high. 7 This lack of
competition by new carriers creates a concentration of a
few incumbent airlines at individual airports, resulting in
less choice and higher ticket prices for the consumer.
The hub system is another tool that has increased single
airline concentration at airports. The hub system brings
- Knutson, supra note 8, at B4.
295 Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 273-95.
Bliss & Lewis, supra note 27, at 296.
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passengers from smaller cities to a central airport along
"spokes." Passengers having the same final destination are
collected at the central airport or hub and then routed to
their destination. 98 Deregulation of the airline industry
and the demise of CAB control over routes facilitated the
development of the hub system. The airlines argue that the
hub system is cost efficient and, in order to create an effec-
tive hub, individual airline control of a substantial number
of gates and facilities at specific airports is required.299 Un-
fortunately, the hub system has caused inefficient use of air-
port facilities and has directly led to specific airline
concentration at airports.0 0 Combination of the hub sys-
tem and exclusive use, long term lease agreements has re-
sulted in single airline control, over-boarding gates, landing
and take-off slots, and airport over-expansion. 0 '
In addition to the effects of lack of competition on con-
centration, deregulation has also spawned increased airline
concentration at individual airports. In 1984, after the de-
mise of the CAB, federal responsibility for overseeing the
economic structure of the airline industry was allocated to
the DOT. 0 2 Under the Deregulation Act, airline mergers
and acquisitions must pass DOT's review process and meet
with the agency's ultimate approval. 3  The review process
is heavily weighted in favor of merger and acquisition ap-
proval. For example, the agency must approve a proposed
merger or acquisition unless it finds that the transfer would
not be "consistent with the public interest," or would have
certain anticompetitive effects.3 0 4 Despite the anticompeti-
tion proviso, the policy almost amounts to a presumption of
- See Note, supra note 3, at 550.
- Id. at 550-51.
300 Id. at 551.
30, Id.
- 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b), repealed by Act ofJuly 5, 1994 Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat. 1379 (subject matter of this section to be codifed generally at 49 U.S.C.§§ 41101-42112); see also Bliss & Lewis, supra note 27, at 293.
-03 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b), repealed byAct ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat. 1379 (subject matter of this section to be codifed generally at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 41101-42112).
-o See Bliss & Lewis, supra note 27, at 293 (citation omitted).
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agency approval of any proposed airline merger or acquisi-
tion. In fact, this DOT policy contributed significantly to
the substantial consolidation of the aviation industry after
the demise of the CAB. 30 5
The DOT's policy favoring airline transfer approval is sig-
nificant because of the industry's enormous economic
losses and the number of carrier bankruptcies that have re-
sulted. Airline mergers and carrier acquisitions are a natu-
ral byproduct of these bankruptcies for several reasons:
First, carrier management perceives that when the dust set-
tes in the Darwinian marketplace, only the strong will sur-
vive, and the largest members will dominate the industry.
Second, acquisition of a rival is often a less expensive means
of growing than gradually opening up new markets through
internal expansion.... Third, the candy store is open; the
antitrust mood in Washington, D.C., has not been more per-
missive in this century than it is now .... Fourth, the psy-
chology of the stampede is to join or be trampled by the
hooves of the charging beasts.306
In this way, the economic tailspin of the airline industry has
led to an increased number of carrier bankruptcies that
have, in turn, fueled the industry's "urge to merge." 0 7 The
liberal approval policy of airline mergers and acquisitions
espoused by DOT has been, in effect, a key accomplice in
the rise of single airline concentration at individual
airports.
Airline concentration is dangerous for the industry and
the air traveler because it locks up the carrier market share
at airports. It also drives ticket prices up and increases the
probability of distress sale pricing, a phenomenon to which
the airline industry is more susceptible than most because it
markets a product that is, in effect, instantly perishable. °8
Airline concentration is a very real problem. Reports indi-
cate that since deregulation began in 1978, the aviation in-
30 Id. "In 1984, the four largest U.S. airlines constituted 54% of the U.S. market
... and the top ten airlines constituted 73.3%." Id.
306 Dempsey, supra note 280, at 599.
3O7 Id.
3- Id. at 589.
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dustry has grown increasingly more concentrated.3 0 9 These
reports are supported by the fact that the market share of
the top ten airlines, as measured by domestic revenue pas-
senger miles, has grown from seventy-eight percent in 1984
to ninety-four percent in 1989.310
In addition to enhancing competition between estab-
lished and new carriers, PFC revenue may offer the solution
to the problem of airline concentration. Airports that re-
ceive approval for PFC collection may use the revenue to
expand their facilities without the financial help of the resi-
dent, incumbent airlines. Without airport indebtedness to
individual airlines, restrictive lease agreements will not be
made. New carriers can enter the airport's geographical
market and offer competitive fares and routes. Single air-
line concentration at airports and in geographical regions
will be reduced. New carriers, however, will have to guard
against attempted takeovers through mergers and acquisi-
tions by the larger airlines. This task will be difficult in light
of the liberal policy for approval of airline transfers. It is
possible, though, that the jolt the industry feels from new
carrier competition, combined with the recent gains
achieved by the airlines through basic belt tightening, will
keep younger and weaker airlines out of bankruptcy and
safe from takeover.
C. CAPACrrY
As single airline concentration was engendered by the an-
ticompetitive nature of the aviation industry, so too was one
final problem area: airport capacity. The air travel infra-
structure of the United States is seriously constrained. In
1990, twenty-two major airports in the United States re-
ported that they were suffering from lack of capacity.
311
The consequence of airline overcrowding at airports is sig-
nificant to the quality of transportation in the United
States. In 1990, the twenty-two airports that reported a lack
See Note, supra note 3, at 548.
3l0 Id.
-,, Reilly, supra note 4, at 32.
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of capacity exceeded 20,000 hours annually of airline flight
delays. 12 Unfortunately, relief does not seem imminent.
By 1997, estimates predict that the number of airports ex-
ceeding 50,000 hours of delay will more than triple. More-
over, the number of airports predicted to have between
50,000 and 100,000 hours of airline aircraft delay will be as
many as fourteen.313 Aircraft delay is not simply a frustra-
tion and an inconvenience to air travelers. Rather, it is a
tremendous monetary loss to airlines and the economy.
The cost of delays to the airlines in 1990 was approximately
three billion dollars.3 1 4 If, as expected, the number of
hours of delay increases, so too will the losses in the billions
of dollars to the airlines and the United States economy.
Here again, PFCs offer a solution to the problem of air-
port overcrowding and the costs of aircraft delay. Revenue
from PFCs could be used to cover the costs of building and
maintaining new airport facilities, allowing airports to grow
in concert with economic need. Without PFCs, the only
other means of increasing airport capacity, given what
would be the continued existence of restrictive leases with
MII clauses, would be the use of money in the Airport and
Airways Trust Fund.315
The money in the Airport and Airways Trust Fund is gen-
erated by a series of airline industry taxes, which include a
tax on passenger tickets and a fuel tax.316 The fund consists
of an average interest earning balance of more than fifteen
billion dollars, at least five billion dollars of which is uncom-
mitted surplus.3 1 7 This surplus could conceivably be used
to solve the airport capacity problem. It has been suggested
that Congress create a revolving loan fund for airports by
depositing a single lump sum from the surplus or by a series




,5 26 U.S.C. § 9502 (Supp. V 1993).
-16 Id.
-7 Mar. 1993 Tax Report, supra note 172, at G-10.
sJ8 Reilly, supra note 4, at 35.
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suggestion and any other suggestion for using trust fund
money for airport capacity purposes is that the money does
not flow directly to the intended purpose. Instead, the air-
line taxes flow into the Treasury. 19 The Treasury then fun-
nels the airline taxes into the Aviation Trust Fund for
future spending by the FAA.3 20 The FAA, however, cannot
reach the money until it is appropriated by Congress, which
happens only after expenditures are authorized through
the congressional budget process.3 2 1 The congressional
budget process, in turn, can only happen after an executive
branch budget process that involves the FAA, the office of
the Secretary of Transportation, the Office of Management
and Budget, and the White House. 22 In contrast to this
lengthy appropriations process, PFC revenue is directly
channeled to the airport capital project for which it is ap-
proved and is a much more expedient means to fund air-
port expansion and increase capacity.
D. THE REST OF THE STORY
The preceding sections have identified the problem areas
of the air transportation industry. As discussed, PFCs could
easily play a large role in alleviating each of these difficul-
ties. There remain two additional areas in which PFC reve-
nue could play a role. These areas are noise control and
safety.
1. Noise Control
The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990323 was passed
in response to recent concern over airport noise.3 24 The
Act calls for the creation of a national noise policy that




3o 49 U.S.C. § 2101, repealed by Act ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),
108 Stat. 1379 (subject matter of this section to be codified generally at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 47101-47533).
524 See Pamela B. Stein, Comment, The Price of Success: Mitigation and Litigation in
Airport Growth, 57J. AIR L. & CoM. 513, 537 (1991).
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would coordinate the independent policies of individual
airports.125 The Act emphasizes regulations and approval
policies that depend upon the type of aircraft employed at
an airport and the level of noise created by that aircraft.126
Failure to meet any of the regulations may result in airport
ineligibility for PFC collection. 7 Although withholding
PFC eligibility is an effective means of enforcing noise con-
trol policies, it eliminates the creation of needed additional
capacity through PFC revenue at airports that fail to meet
the Act's regulations. Many airports may fail to meet these
regulations as they grow, attract more flights and larger air-
craft, and require longer or additional runways. 328 More-
over, local laws often require aircraft noise abatement
procedures that tend to reduce the existing, limited airport
capacity. These procedures are nothing more than restric-
tions that prevent the use of certain airport approach and
departure paths, limit the number of aircraft operations or
the hours of operation, or require preferential runway use
or period rotation of alternate runways.3 29
In order to "maintain current airport capacity and to re-
move roadblocks to new construction a comprehensive na-
tional noise program must be fashioned."330 This program
must do more than remove eligibility for PFCs if certain
noise regulations are not met. It must recognize that PFC
revenue is crucial to solve the airport capacity crisis affect-
ing air travel and reconcile noise control with airport
growth.
2. Safety
In short, as long as the airline industry remains un-
healthy, serious questions arise regarding the safety of air
53- 49 U.S.C. § 2101, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),




- Stein, supra note 324, at 555.
-2 Reilly, supra note 4, at 34.
330 Id.
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travel. These questions arise because of the obvious danger
of poor or nonexistent profits creating a tendency by man-
agement to curtail costs that could take the form of signifi-
cantly diminished maintenance work.33 ' At least while the
industry is suffering from massive economic losses, a certain
percentage of airport-allocated PFC revenue could be set
aside to ensure a basic level of air safety for the traveling
public. Even after airlines begin to realize a continued
profit, PFC revenue used for safety purposes could be a per-
manent fixture of the service airports provide to air
travelers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the many valuable airport uses to which PFC reve-
nue may be put, it is imperative for improved air travel in
the United States and the health of the airline industry that
PFC revenue not be diverted for extraneous, city uses. As
one commentator states, "[t]he traveling public deserves a
safe, efficient, and healthy airline industry providing an ad-
equate level of service at a reasonable price."3 3 2 PFCs used
exclusively for airport and airline purposes may be the
means to accomplish this goal and the magic that lifts the
curse and the albatross from the neck of the airline
industry.
331 Dempsey, supra note 14, at 352.
332 Dempsey, supra note 280, at 590.

